Showing posts with label Hume. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hume. Show all posts

Saturday, September 12, 2009

Hume and Convention

How is justice a Hawk-Dove Game? (For my students I also posted this under Week 3 in Blackboard).

Hume makes this possibility clear with the following example (not included in our readings):

"Two Grecian colonies, leaving their native country, in search of new seats, were inform'd that a city near them was deserted by its inhabitants. To know the truth of this report, they dispatch'd at once two messengers, one from each colony; who finding on their approach, that their information was true, begun a race together with an intention to take possession of the city, each of them for his countrymen. One of these messengers, finding that he was not an equal match for the other, launch'd his spear at the gates of the city, and was so fortunate as to fix it there before the arrival of his companion. This produc'd a dispute betwixt the two colonies . . ."

The choice facing each colony is whether to fight over the city or not. The case of the two Grecian colonies is not a coordination game, since there is a considerable conflict of interest present. Neither is it a prisoners, dilemma, since there is no dominant strategy for either player. These types of conflicts over goods can be modeled as a Hawk-Dove game

The Hawk-Dove game consists of two strategies: the aggressive “hawk” strategy and the passive “dove” strategy. A hawk is willing to fight over the disputed good. A dove initially stakes a claim to half of the good. If, however, her opponent shows any signs of aggression, then the dove relinquishes all claims to the good. Therefore, if two doves meet, the good is equally divided between them. If a dove meets a hawk, the hawk acquires all of the good and the dove receives nothing. If two hawks meet they fight over the good. The parties to the conflict are assumed to be equal in the sense that both members have power to inflict equal expected harm on their rival. Furthermore, in the face of an equal foe both parties should expect an equal chance of victory. This gives us the following game.



Player 2
Dove Hawk
Player 1
Dove 1,1 0,2

Hawk 2,0 -2,-2

Hawk-Dove Game.


The players analyze the game in the following manner. Player one knows that if Player two plays hawk, player one does better to play dove and receive a payoff of 0 instead of -2. On the other hand if player two is going to play dove, player one does better to play hawk for a payoff of 2. The same reasoning applies to player two as well.

Agents wishing to form a convention for the stability of possession will face a hawk-dove game in at least two situations: original appropriation and those instances where, even if homogeneous, an agent could gain by taking another's possessions. The hawk-dove game represents the very real element of force present, or implied, in forming a convention for the stability of possession. The best thing to do still depends on what one's opponent(s) will do.

This is why convention and possession are so important for Hume ( see p. 259 of our readings). Possession lets us know who will play hawk and who will play dove. If I know possessors will play hawk, then with respect to the possessions of others I will play dove, and vice versa. We each know and recognize this we leave each other alone to enjoy our possessions. It is through repeated respect for possession then that rules of property begin to arise.

Hobbes is right that it is war, but he’s wrong to say that it is still war even after a period of silence. Locke is right to say that there are rights to property, but he fails to tell us how it is that agents come to respect these rights when there is no government. Hume completes the story for both. When we recognize the game we are playing, we understand that some form of order is better than none. Possession is the signal we use to establish that order.

Possession may not be 9/10s of the law, but it is 9/10ths of the origin of property. See page 275 of the readings. Mix your labor with somebody else’s field and see what happens.

Basically from 259-275 Hume is talking about how selfish individuals in a scarce world solve the problem of fighting. Think of it as an intricate dance where each has a role to play, possessor or non-possessor, and it is this dance between the two he calls convention.

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Hume and The Problem of Cooperation

We are born weak and needy.

We can’t do much by ourselves.

Notice on p. 254 the benefits of working together: 1) more power, 2) increased ability through “partition of employments” 3) mutual protection We gain all three in society.

Society is advantageous – but how do we learn this? Sexual desire draws people together and spawns families. It is within families that we first learn of the benefits of cooperation.

Why worry about this?

Consider the problem – we know society is advantageous, but we are selfish and this is an impediment to the formation of society. The standard answer to this is that we need to be more generous and kind. Hume, though, rightly points out that this makes matters worse since kindness is connected more powerfully to those close to us. Think of a mother bear and her cubs. Come between her and her children and she will kill you, even if you just accidentally strayed. This is a new reason for fighting on top of Hobbesian selfishness – helping those we love. Generosity, then, allows us to have our family or clan as a small society but it will go no further. Instead of individuals in a state of war we now have families in that state.

What makes it even worse is that the easily transferrable goods we all want, like food, are scarce. In order to get the things I want it looks like my family will have to fight yours.

Remember, though, that society is better than war and we know this. How then do we make society larger?

The relevance to business is direct. People immediately realize the problems self interest creates. However, their responses are as tired as they are mistaken. There is no general love of mankind. We are not Gods. Telling us to be more kind results in us being more kind – to those closest to us. Is it any wonder that the stories of the “greedy” CEO is accompanied by the story of how those closest to him enabled the unethical behavior. They were kind to each other while they fleeced everyone else. How then to overcome this problem? We need to since business depends upon the widespread cooperation known as “The Market”.


BK